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—  Book Rev iew  — 
Michael Stokes Paulsen and  
Luke Paulsen, The Constitution:  
An Introduction  
Shlomo Slonim† 
Mark Twain once defined a classic as a work “that everybody wants 
to have read and nobody wants to read.”1 The U.S. Constitution, 
adopted in 1788, is a classic document that many Americans have surely 
read, but how many of them are familiar with its contents? 
Anyone interested in learning more about the Constitution, its 
interpretation and development over the past two-plus centuries, and 
which issues are today the most critically divisive, will find this work 
to be a superb and eminently readable introduction. It is instructive 
and enlightening without being ponderous. The prose is crisp and 
straightforward, unburdened by legal jargon. There are no footnotes or 
endnotes. And the reader requires no legal dictionary to appreciate the 
thrust of the discussion at each point. 
The authors are a father-son team, Michael and Luke Paulsen, who 
collaborated on the book over nine consecutive summers. Michael is a 
foremost Constitutional Law scholar who previously held a disting-
uished chair at the Law School of the University of Minnesota and who 
currently occupies such a chair at St. Thomas University in Minne-
apolis. Luke, a high schooler, and later, college student, thoroughly and 
challengingly discussed each topic, thereby enhancing the clarity and 
usefulness of this tome to lay readers as well as to seasoned scholars in 
the field. Moreover, useful biographical and historical sketches are virt-
ual gems that pepper the work throughout. 
The first part of the book is devoted to “The Written Constitution.” 
Here the authors present the historical background to the adoption of 
Constitution and to the Bill of Rights. They describe the forces that 
led to the Constitutional Convention of 1787 and the decision of the 
delegates to jettison the dysfunctional Articles of Confederation and 
replace them with a document that would weld the thirteen separate 
states into one nation ruled by a strong central government. They 
highlight the controversies that emerged in Philadelphia and the com-
promises that reconciled large and small states; North and South; and 
advocates of stronger central government and proponents of more state  
†  LL.B (Melbourne) Ph.D. (Columbia), James G. McDonald Professor of 
American History, Emeritus, at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. 
1.  Mark Twain, Address at the Dinner of the Nineteenth Century Club: The 
Disappearance of Literature (Nov. 20 1900). 
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autonomy. The need to bridge the gap between the last of these rival 
forces persisted after the Convention closed, and it featured mightily in 
the ratification struggle. In the end, the controversy was resolved by 
the adoption of the Bill of Rights which reassured states’ righters that 
the rights of citizens and of independent states would be secured. 
In a biographical sketch of James Madison, the Paulsens attribute 
to him “the structure and content” of the Constitution. In extolling 
Madison’s virtues, the authors, it would seem, have been overly gener-
ous to him. Madison is justly remembered as the “Father of the Consti-
tution.” His resourcefulness in organizing the 1787 Constitutional con-
clave, his diligence in promoting the ratification of the Constitution, 
and his ingenuity in satisfying the Antifederalists with the adoption of 
a Bill of Rights, all entitle him to that accolade. However, the Consti-
tution’s federal system of government was adopted over his strong 
objections.2 In fact, he strove to establish a powerful central government 
that would completely dominate the states, practically converting them 
into mere counties.3 For all his contributions to the Founding, the fed-
eral character of the Constitution was not of his making. 
Notwithstanding all their praise and appreciation of the provisions 
of the Constitution, the authors understandably roundly condemn what 
they term the framers’ “collusion with evil”—slavery. Three provisions, 
in particular, highlight the concession to slavery—the “three-fifths 
clause” which accorded slave states an increment in their representation 
in the House of Representatives,4 and which resulted in Jefferson, rather 
than John Adams, emerging as President in 1800;5 the fugitive slave 
clause;6 and the importation clause permitting importation of slaves for 
another twenty years.7 Only the Civil War erased the stain of slavery 
from the Constitution. In this connection, the authors might well have 
cited the Jeremiad regarding the historic consequences of slavery, 
sounded at the Convention by George Mason, himself a slave-owner.8 
The second and more analytic part of the book is aptly labeled 
“Living the Constitution.” Here the authors trace the background to 
 
2. See generally, Shlomo Slonim, Securing States’ Interests at the 1787 
Constitutional Convention: A Reassessment, 14 Stud. in Am. Pol. Dev. 
1 (2000).   
3. Id.  
4.  U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. 
5.  Paul Finkelman, Slavery and the Founders: Race and Liberty 
in the Age of Jefferson 253 (2014) (“Indeed, without the electoral 
votes provided by the three-fifths clause, Jefferson would not have defeated 
John Adams in 1800.”). 
6.  U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3. 
7.  U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 1. 
8.  Max Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, 
Vol. 2 370 (1937).  
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the first vigorous constitutional debate that pitted Hamilton against 
Jefferson and Madison over expansive versus narrow interpretation of 
the Constitution. This dispute was only resolved with the epic decision 
of Chief Justice John Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland9 in 1819 
endorsing Hamilton’s broad interpretation. 
The drastic consequences of the ill-fated Dred Scott v. Sanford10 
decision in 1857 (that paved the way ultimately to the conflict between 
North and South over the right to extend slavery into the new 
territories) are well explicated. 
In this section one reads of Lincoln’s role in saving the Union, and 
also of his grandeur in giving expression to the cause for which the 
North was fighting. The authors posit that Lincoln’s stand was premis-
ed on vigorous denial that the decisions of the Supreme Court could 
bind the nation and thereby prevent prosecution of the war. Reconstr-
uction and the adoption of the Civil War amendments drastically alter-
ed the scope and impact of the Constitution by outlawing slavery and 
making the states subject to civil rights.11 But it would take another 
century before the cause of nondiscrimination would prevail in the 
Court, and ultimately in the Congress, so as to convert theory into 
practice. 
Why did the struggle for racial equality take so long? The authors 
address this question in a chapter entitled “Betrayal.” The Supreme 
Court, they explain, adopted a narrow, indeed retrograde, approach to 
the relevant amendments. In the key case, Plessy v. Ferguson,12 decided 
in 1896, the Court ruled that “separate but equal” conformed to the 
14th Amendment. This laid the groundwork for segregation in the 
South and legalized racial discrimination throughout the country. 
The authors charge that in a series of cases the Supreme Court 
emasculated the intent of the 14th Amendment by adopting a policy of 
substantive due process to impose their own social and economic values 
in judging both state and national legislation. Thus, in Lochner v. New 
York,13 the Court invalidated a state law limiting working hours in 
certain industries on the ground that it denied freedom of contract to 
employers and employees, and thereby violated the 14th Amendment’s 
Due Process clause. In Hammer v. Dagenhart,14 the Court ruled that 
Congress lacked power under the interstate commerce clause to regulate 
child labor. This form of judicial activism against legislative prerogative 
represented a distortion of the Court’s role under the Constitution. 
 
9.  5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
10.  60 U.S. 393 (1857). 
11.  U.S. Const. amends. XII, XIV. 
12.  163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
13.  198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
14.  247 U.S. 251 (1918). 
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It was only in the 1930’s that the Court rectified the gross errors of 
the era of “Betrayal” and adopted a philosophy of judicial restraint, 
acknowledging the sovereign right of a legislature to act to improve the 
public welfare. At the same time, however, the authors are bitterly 
critical of the Supreme Court’s failure, in its 1944 Korematsu v. United 
States15 decision, to invalidate the wartime internment of thousands of 
American citizens of Japanese descent. They regard that decision as 
“one of the most infamous injustices in the Supreme Court’s history.” 
The authors applaud the 1952 decision in Youngstown Sheet & Tube 
Co. v. Sawyer16 for preserving the principle of the separation of powers 
by denying President Truman the power to seize steel mills during the 
Korean War to avoid a strike. And the judgments confirming civil liber-
ties and civil rights, especially Brown v. Board of Education,17 are hailed 
as long-overdue measures to restore rights that had been denied for too 
long. 
Finally, in the last chapter, entitled “Controversy,” the authors 
roundly criticize what they call “The Modern Era of Judicial Activism.” 
Most specifically, they question the Court’s approach to such matters 
as race-based affirmative action; reapportionment; and the privacy 
decisions on birth control, abortion, gay rights, and the right to die. 
These decisions, they contend, reflect a revival of substantive due pro-
cess in the service of interpretive liberty. It all derives from a sense of 
judicial supremacy which many would contest. Another sphere of jud-
icial activism is revealed in a series of more recent decisions based on 
the Court’s understanding of federalism that ostensibly requires it to 
protect the states from federal infringement of their sovereignty. 
Accordingly, the Supreme Court feels obliged to strike down federal 
laws of a general nature that even incidentally affect state powers. 
This work was completed before the Supreme Court handed down 
its 2015 decision of Obergefell v. Hodges,18 which ruled that the term 
marriage embraced same-sex unions no less than heterosexual ones, and 
that official failure to acknowledge this was a violation of the Due Pro-
cess clause and the Equal Protection clause. It would have been inter-
esting to learn the view of the authors on this revolutionary decision. 
The book presents a masterful, albeit brief, analytical account of 
the importance of constitutional interpretation in the historical develop-
ment of the United States. It incisively compares the varied interpret-
ations that have been applied to the provisions of the Constitution, for 
good and bad. It is an invaluable work that challenges as much as it 
inspires. 
 
15.  323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
16.  343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
17.  347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
18.  135 S. Ct. 2071 (2015). 
